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INDUSTRIAL LAW CASES 
LA WYERS AS EMPLOYERS 
Dee v. Kensington Haynes and White, Industrial Court, Auckland ; 
27 May 1977 (I.C. 21/77); Jamieson J. 
The British Parliamentary model, as 
adopted in New Zealand, is characterised 
by the supremacy of the Rule of Law, as 
opposed to the arbitrary whim of man or 
party. The Prime Minister, and " regal auth-
ority," are subJect to the Rule of Law: see 
Fitzgerald v Muldoon (1976) 2 NZLR 615, 
the case wherein the Chief Just1ce decided 
that Mr Muldoon could not suspend an act 
of Parliament by press release. Trade 
unions are subject to the Rule of Law, as 
the other caseg noted in these pages illu-
strate. The instant decision demonstrates 
that even lawyers and law firms are bound 
by the Rule of Law; ltke other employers 
they must obey the statutory requ1rements 
of dispute settlement. 
The defendant in this case is a promin-
ent Auckland law firm, whose attitude to-
ward the statutorv grievance machinery set 
out in s 117 of the Industrial Relations Act 
('the Act') was found to be "highhanded, 
astonishing, regrettable and unworthy." The 
applicant is a member of the Northern 
Industrial District Legal Employees I.U W. 
and, indeed, is a member of the Executive 
of that Union. Her employment as a re-
ceptionist at the defendant law firm was 
covered by the Northern Industrial Distnct 
Legal Employees Award ('the Award'), re-
corded at 76 B.A. 1565. 
The applicant sought leave from her 
employer to attend union business on a 
workday, being Wednesday, 1 December, 
1976. There was some confusion before 
the event as to whether she had sought 
leave to attend a 'union meeting,' or a 
Conciliation Council. As it was a busy time 
for the employer, her request was rejected, 
but she attended the Council , as an asses-
sor, without such permission. When she 
returned from Conciliation, she found that 
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her final pay cheque had been made up, 
and she was summarily dismissed, albeit 
with two weeks' waoes in lieu of notice. 
~ 
The Union immediately sought concilia-
tion and arranged for a Conciliator to chai r 
the Grievance Committee set up pursuant 
to Cl. 30 of the Award , a clause which 
follows the model set out in s 117 of the 
Act. The employer refused to take part in 
this statutorily required procedure, appar-
ently because the partners of the law fi rm 
had unilaterally decided that reinstatement 
was impossible. 
The Court noted that the arrogant and 
highhanded attitude of the law f1rm ("a dis-
astrous mistake") precluded reasonable 
discussion at the time of the dismissal, and 
when the grievance procedures were invok-
ed. The Court also indicated that the Union 
would have prevailed had they elected to 
pursue a "victimisation" remedy under the 
penal provisions of s 150. The Court found 
the dismissal was not justified. The appli-
cant was awarded $500 compensation and 
costs. 
It should be noted that this decision 
marks the first application of the 1976 
amendment to the personal grievance 
machinery of the Act, being subsection 3A 
of s 117 of the Act, as inserted by s 19 
of the Industrial Relations Amendment Act 
(No. 2) 1976. That subsection allows the 
Industrial Court to give leave to a worker 
to come directly to the Industrial Court, 
without going through the grievance pro-
cedure of s 117 (4), when either the wor-
ker's union or the worker's employer fails 
to act promptly in accordance with those 
procedures Hitherto there was no access 
to that Court for an individual worker in 
any case. @ 
STRIKE ACTION DURING DISPUTE 
SETTLfMENT 
New Zealand Labourers, General Workers and Related Trades Industrial 
Union of Workers v. Downer & Co. Industri al Court, Wellington; 29 April 
1977 (I.C. 11/77); Jamieson J. 
Section 116 of the Industrial Relations 
Act sets out a model dispute settlement 
clause to be included in every award and 
collective agreement. Subclause 7 of that 
model provides, in part, that: 
" The essence of this clause being 
that, pending the settlement of the 
dispute, the work of the employer 
shall not on any account be impeded 
but shall at all times proceed as if no 
dispute had arisen, it is hereby pro-
vided that - No worker employed by 
an employer who is a party to the 
dispute shall discontinue or impede 
normal work, either totally or partially, 
because of the dispute." 
This unanimous decision of the Industrial 
Court stresses the importance of that non-
interruption of work subclause. 
A dispute arose about carpentry work in 
a tunnel project on the Wellington motor-
way. The tunnellers involved took strike 
action in pursuit of their claims. The sub-
stantive issue was resolved in a disputes 
committee convened under Cl. 24 of the 
relevant award, the New Zealand Building , 
Quarrying, Contracting, Civi I Engineering, 
Constructional, and Allied Industries Lab-
ourers and Other Workers Collective 
Agreement, recorded at 75 B.A. 10625. An 
ancillary issue, not successfully resolved 
by the parties, concerned wages lost by 
the men who took direct action during the 
dispute. The Chairman of the Dispute 
Committee rejected the union claim for lost 
wages, and his decision was vigorously 
upheld by the lndustnal Court. 
The ratio of the Chairman's decision, as 
quoted by Jamieson J, is as follows: 
"The over-riding factor in considera-
tion of this issue must however be 
that the disputes procedure of the 
Agreement was ignored. To support 
the union claim in whole or in part 
would be tantamount to participating 
in rejection of the procedure." ® 
THE LAW STUDENT AND THE 
BUS DRIVERS 
Harder v. The New Zealand Tramways and Public Passengers Transport 
Authorities Employees I.U.W., Supreme Court, Auckland. 28 April 1977; 
11 May 1977 (A441/77). Chilwell J. 
This note is an attempt to dispel the 
confusion, misunderstanding, and misrepre-
sentation which has been so characteristic 
of the Harder case, a case which is actu-
ally quite simple in substantive legal prin-
ciple. Perhaps the easiest way to grasp 
that legal principle, and to dash such mis-
representation, is to examine several 
aspects of industrial law which are not 
manifested in this case. 
First, Harder's cause of action is not 
grounded in one of the so-called .. indus-
trial torts, " known to the common law as 
the tort of intimidation and the tort of 
inducing breach of contract. These common 
law actions always involve at least three 
parties, and a contractual nexus between 
the injured plaintiff and the third party. See, 
for example, Rookes v Barnard (1964) A.C. 
1129, Pete's Towing Services Ltd v North-
ern Drivers IUW (1970) NZLR 32, Flett v 
Northern Drivers IUW (1970) NZLR 1050. 
and Northern Drivers IUW v Kawau Island 
Ferries (1974) 2 NZLR 617. In these four 
cases the contractual third parties {being 
neither defendants or plaintiffs) were, in 
order: B.O.A.C. (employer of Rookes); 
Ready Mixed Concrete (purchaser of sand 
from Pete's Towing); Dominion Breweries 
and New Zealand Breweries (suppliers of 
beer to Flett); and Mobi I Oi I (suppliers of 
fuel to the ferry services). In each case the 
plaintiff suffered either the breach of that 
contract or its termination owing to the 
pressure applied to the innocent third party 
by the defendant union. In none of the 
cases would the third party have severed 
those contractual relations on its own 
motion; the cases turned on whether the 
defendant union used unlawful means to 
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apply pressure on the third party. 
There is, to be sure, a third party in 
the mstant case, bemg the Local Authorit-
ies Public Passenger Transport Associa-
tion, in general, and the Auckland Regional 
Authority ("the A R.A.' ) in particular 
Plaintiff Harder, however, had no contract-
ual relation with the ARA; failure on the 
part of the ARA to provide a bus service 
to Harder neither breached nor terminated 
any contract with Harder. Therefore, no 
common law industrial tort cause of action 
was possible. 
Secondly, Harder's cause of action was 
not a quasi-criminal prosecution of the 
union in the Industrial Court, as was made 
possible by the pun1t1ve industrial legisla-
tion passed in 1976. The punitive aspects 
of this legislation, being section 21 of the 
Industrial Relations Amendment Act (No 2) 
1976 and section 36 of the Commerce 
Amendment Act 1976, were carefully 
eschewed by Harder in spite of their clear 
relevance to the facts of the case. The 
former amendment provides penalties, 
available only 1n the Industrial Court, of up 
to $1500 for a union party to a strike in 
an essential industry where 14 days not1ce 
was not given and the latter amendment 
creates a power 1n the Industrial Court to 
order ''a resumption of full work" where 
the economy of a particular 1 ndustry is 
senously affected This power is similarly 
backed by the availability of a $1500 pen 
alty against the union for non-compliance 
with a resumption of work order. G1ven 
the well-known un1on hostility to such penal 
prov1s10ns, Harder took the less-1 nflam-
matory course of seeking reltef in the 
Supreme Court, where neither of these 
remedies is available. And the Government 
itself, although responsible for this very 
pertinent industrial legislation. went to great 
pains to avoid any involvement in the con-
troversy, in soite of adverse comment from 
back-bench Government Members of Par-
liament. 
This case, then, involved neither the 
judicially created common law industrial 
torts nor the statutory penalties contrived 
m 1976 by the National Government 
THE FACTS 
Section 125 of the Industrial Relations 
Act, as enacted in 1973 by the then Labour 
Government, requires unions and employers 
engaged in certain essential industnes to 
give 14 days not1ce of stnkes or lockouts 
respectively. This provision was carried 
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over. intact, from sect ton 196 of the 1954 
Industrial Conciliatton and Arb1trat10n Act 
The 1954 Act had in turn brought forward 
the 14-day notice requirement from an Act 
of the same name of 1925. And the 1925 
Act, in its turn, had merely re-enacted a 
similar provision contained in the Act of 
1908 So the concept of strike not1ce in 
essential industries has been part of New 
Zealand industrial law for seven full dec-
ades. Indeed, when the New Zealand Fed-
eration of Labour made submissions on the 
I ndustnal Relations Bi II in February of 1973, 
the FOL strongly opposed the penalties 
contamed in that 8111, but made no specific 
reference to this historical notice requ1 re-
ment. (Paragraphs 49-54, submissions to 
Labour Bills Select Committee). The pen-
alty provisions contained in that Bi II were 
dropped before it became law, and the 
unopposed nottce requirement remained. 
The New Zealand Tramways Un10n 
wh1ch operates in the context of an essen-
tial industry, had been negotiating with the 
Local Authorities Public Passenger Trans-
port Associ at ion for some 15 to 18 months 
when they "became dissatisfied with pro-
gress." 
The Union quite properly gave not1ce to 
the employer, as requ1red by law, in a 
letter received by the ARA on 23 March. 
According to an atfidavrt filed w1th the 
Court, this notice warned of strike actron 
to be taken on the "6th and 7th Apri I 1977 
and on Thursday and Friday of every week 
thereafter .. . " Either the onginal strike 
notice was miscalculated. or the affidavit 
was in error, for the f1rst Thursday and 
Friday in April are the 7th and 8th, not 
the 6th and 7th. In any event, a strike 
notice delivered on 23 March would statu-
torily suffice for a stoppage commencing 
Thursday, 7 April, that day be1ng the 15th 
day after the 23rd of March. Mr Justice 
Chilwell, perhaps confused by the mistake 
in the affidavit, m1scou nted the 14-day 
period and, with all due respect, quite 
wrongly found that the notice would not 
be ettect1ve until Friday 8 April. In the 
event, however, this strike did not occur; 
negotiations in fact continued, the strike 
notice of 23 March was spent. and the 
error of the learned judge is not relevant. 
The Union, apparently, "became dissatis-
fied a second time" and sent a telegram 
to the employer on 15 April purporting to 
give notice for a strike wh1ch would com-
mence on 21 April. This telegram quite 
obviously did not fulfil the statutory require-
ments. Counsel for the Union submitted 
that the letter delivered on 23 March could 
apply to the strike contemplated on 15 
April, but the very words of the National 
Secretary of the Union defeated that con-
tention. Chilwell J noted the following press 
report, which referred to the said telegram 
and which was not disputed by the Union: 
·• (M r Stubbs, the National Secretary), 
agreed that the strike notice (in the 
telegram) was less than required but 
he said it was enough." 
Thus ably assisted by the words of the 
Union Secretary, M r Justice Chilwell had 
no difficulty in finding the notice inade-
quate and the strike illegal. And, having 
made that interim finding of fact, Chilwell J 
was then left with the rather simple judi-
cial task, or judicial posture, so ably re-
fined by Lord Denning MR: 
11 (The statute in question was) en-
acted by Parliament. It is, I take it, the 
will of Parliament that it shall be obey-
ed. Even by the most powerfu I. Even 
by the trade unions. We cannot 
change the law. We sit here to carry 
out the will of Parliament. To see that 
the law is obeyed, and that we wi II 
do. 
"The order which is sought is noth-
ing more or less than reporting the 
very words of the Act of Parliament 
itself - it does not add to it or 
detract from it by the least. All we 
are asked to do is to make an order 
against the (Union) saying it must obey 
the Act of Parliament ·• 
Gouriet v Union of Post Office Wor-
kers (1977) 1 All E.R. 696. 719, 704. 
THE PLAINTIFF 
Plaintiff Harder sought injunctive rei i ef 
on two grounds: first, as a member of the 
public he has a general interest in seeing 
that statutes are obeyed; secondly, as a 
habitual bus passenger, he has suffered 
proximate financial loss because of the 
illegal action of the defendant, action taken 
in direct violation of a statutory duty. 
With respect to the first cause of action, 
Chilwell J noted that ordinarily the Attorney-
General was the nominal plaintiff in such 
actions, by means of the so-called relator 
action. However, Chilwell J also noted two 
recent decisions of the English Court of 
Appeal which "unshackled the procedural 
di ff icult ies of the past'' and which allow 
such plaintiff to proceed without the 
Attorney-General. The two cases are 
Attorney-General (on the relation of Mc-
Whirter) v Independent Broadcasting Auth .. 
ority (197 4) QB 629, which involved an 
allegedly illegal television broadcast , and 
Gouriet v Union of Post Office Workers 
(1977) 1 ALL E.R. 696, which concerned a 
strike by postal workers in violation of 
statute. In the former case, because of the 
imminent nature of the broadcast, there 
was no time to seek the relation of the 
Attorney-General, and in tl1e second case 
the Attorney-General refused, for no ex-
press reason, to give his consent. Chi:well 
J found that Harder was in the sume posi-
tion as McWhirter, with inadequate time to 
pursue the relator procedure in We IIi ng ton. 
Therefore Harder could proceed in his own 
name to protect the rights of the public 
and ask that a statute be obeyed. 
Furthermore, Harder was suffering parti-
cular damage, more than was suffered by 
the plaintiffs in McWhirter and G curiet, in 
that he was faced with a necessary expen-
diture of $14 a week for taxi fare in the 
absence of the bus service. Harder's finan-
cial injury was also much greater than that 
suffered by the plaintiff in Fitzgerald v 
Muldoon (1976) 2 NZLR 615, where the 
plaintiff, in a very similar action, could 
show only the loss of $1 a week. 
Secondly, the defendant ov;ed plaintiff 
a duty, imposed by statu te, no t to strike 
without appropriate notice. and the viola-
tion of that statutory duty has caused finan-
cial loss. Even though there may be other 
remedies for such illegal behaviour, the 
supreme Court has a residual equitable 
power to enforce obedience to the law, 
and to prevent 8 continuing statutory tort. 
The learned judge Acknowledged that the 
nature of the statutory tort was a "serious 
question to be tried and no one can be 
certain of the answer.'' But this hearing , 
was only an application for an interim in-
junction, and such an application is not 
the same as the careful consideration of 
a final hearing. The test at this preliminary 
stage is whether or not there is a serious 
question to be tried. 
THE DECISION 
Having found as a matter of law that 
Harder was a proper plaintiff, with standing 
to complain, and having found as a matter 
of fact that the Union had violated s125 
of the Industrial Relations Act. Chilwell J 
made an interim declaration that the strikes 
of 21-22 April and 28 April were illegal. 
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He also declared, prospectively , that the 
strike scheduled for 29 April would be 
illegal. Finally, he issued an interim in-
junction against the union, " restraining it 
from inciting, instigating , aiding or abettmg 
any future offences by its members against 
the provisions of section 125." The injunc-
tive relief would not take effect until Mon-
day, 2 May 1977 
SEQUELAE 
It is common knowledge that bus services 
did not operate on 5 and 6 May, being the 
Thursday and Friday after the injunction 
took effect. The plaintiff moved to have the 
defendant union found guilty of a contempt 
of Court, having violated the order com-
posed in Court on 28 April. A second 
hearing was held on 11 May, to consider 
the contempt of the Union, again before 
Chilwell J. 
Counsel for defendant union successfully 
argued that this second hearing was in no 
way an interim or interlocutory motion, but 
was in fact a final hearing on the point of 
whether there was or was not a contempt, 
albeit the injunction itself may ultimately 
be held to have been wrongly issued. 
Therefore , plaintiff must prove the contempt 
beyond reasonable doubt, and affidavits by 
plaintiff must be confined to such facts as 
he is able of his own knowledge to prove. 
Chilwell J also acknowledged that the 
Union must be found in contempt as it 
was the party bound by the inJunction It 
is not enough to show that bus services 
did not operate, or that bus drivers d1d 
not show up for work on Thursday or 
Friday - the injunction did not, and could 
not, compel bus drivers to serve their 
employer. The pla intiff must show, said the 
judge, that the Union had incited, Instigat-
ed, aided or abetted the said strike. It was 
enough. however, to show that the officers 
of the Union, being the ' 'brains and guid-
ing hand of the Union" had so acted. 
The affidavit evidence offered by the 
plaintiff was in two forms : (1) assertions 
made by certain officers of the union re-
ported in newspaper articles and (2) asser-
tions made by those officers on television 
interviews and seen by the plaintiff Chit-
well J refused to accept the evidence con-
tained in newspaper articles, as being 
edited hearsay, and clearly inadmissible. 
In making this decision, Chilwell J declined 
to follow the oral unreported decision of 
Mr Justice Mahon of 1 July 1974, where 
Mahon J accepted such evidence to show 
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the contempt of Mr Gordan Andersen in 
the Kawau Island Ferries case (supra). 
Chilwell J, however, did accept Harder's 
affidavit that he had seen officers of the 
Union on television defiantly promising to 
defy the Court order. Such an appearance 
was "tantamount to the person being in 
the home television viewing room mak1ng 
a statement" and admissible under the 
rules of evidence as an "admission against 
interest." 
The following remarks of the National 
Secretary of the Union were found to be 
conclusive evidence of Union defiance, and 
proof beyond reasonable doubt that the 
Union was in contempt of Court: "We will 
defy the Supreme Court injunction and 
strike i ndefin1tely .'' 
"Yes we can win against the Courts and 
the government. It has been proved t1me 
and agam overseas that the Courts and the 
government can be influenced if the support 
is strong enough.'' 
It could be said that both actions, the 
application for an interim injunction and 
the motion for a finding of contempt, suc-
ceeded against the Union primarily because 
of the indiscreet language and arrogant 
attitude of their Union Secretary. 
COMMENT 
None of this, of course , need have hap-
pened. 
After negotiating for over fifteen months. 
there would seem to be little excuse for 
union leadership unable to count to four-
teen accurately. Surely the people as 
employer and the people as consumer 
deserve the protection required by statute 
in New Zealand for seventy years. As for 
the arrogance of the National Secretary. 
that may or may not be explained away by 
recognition of internal union politics. How-
ever, it should be emphasised that Mr 
Stubbs' press statements made out an easy 
case for plaintiff Harder. 
Finally, it should be noted that the clos-
est precedent for Harder's action in New 
Zealand is the case which Fitzgerald 
brought against the Prime Minister in the 
Superannuation affair. Both plaintiffs could 
be characterised as officious political busy-
bodies interfering in a matter only mini-
mally their concern: conversely, both 
plaintiffs could be characterised as cour-
ageous individuals fighting against powerful 
institutions to uphold the rule of law. 0 
W. C. HODGE 
